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CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ROSE ELIZABETH BIRD*
C LINICAL EDUCATION HAS BEEN THE STEPCHILD of legal education for a
long time.' However, its increased acceptance in recent years has
been most heartening. This positive trend could not be more timely, for
the legal profession is coming under increasing scrutiny from both in-
side and outside its own ranks. If legal education is to retain its
relevance, a clinical component is essential. The law students, the law
schools, the profession, and the public can only benefit from its growth
and development.
The remarks that follow are drawn in part from my own experience
as a clinical teacher at Stanford Law School. Clinical education presents
a unique opportunity for the law schools of this country to teach legal
process and professional responsibility while satisfying the desires of
their student bodies for relevancy and for training in the skills and
techniques of trial advocacy. If it had not been for the financial support
of the Ford Foundation through the Council on Legal Education for Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Inc., and the demand by law students for more
relevancy in the law school curriculum, there would have been little
development in clinical education. The historical roots for the resistance
to clinical courses by law school faculties give some insight into what is
basically wrong with much of legal education today.
The law school as it presently exists was shaped in large part by the
*Chief Justice of California.
' For some early discussions of the role of clinical education in the law school
setting see Anderson and Kornblum, Clinical Legal Education: A Growing
Reform, 57 A.B.A.J. 591 (1971); Ares, Legal Education and the Problem of the
Poor, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1965); Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is
Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38 A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); Cantrall, Practical Skills
Can and Must Be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316 (1954); Clad, The
Gap in Legal Education: A Proposed Bridge, 41 A.B.A.J. 45 (1955); Cutler, Inade-
quate Law School Training: A Plan to Give Students Actual Practice, 37
A.B.A.J. 203 (1951); Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947);
Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); Gard-
ner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?-Some Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REV.
785 (1934); Gorman, Proposal for Reform of Legal Education, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
845 (1971); Griswold, Legal Education: Extent to Which "Know-How" in Practice
Should be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 324 (1954); Henderson,
Wherein Do the Law Schools Fail to Prepare a Law Student for Practice, 9 AM.
L. SCH. REV. 1178 (1941); Johnson, A Lay View of Legal Education, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 462 (1943); Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL
EDuC. 211 (1948); McClain, Legal Education: Extent to Which "Know-How" in
Practice Should be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 302 (1953-54); Nut-
ting, The Emerging Lawyer and Legal Education, 16 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1966);
Pound, The University and the Legal Profession, 7 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1940); Stone,
Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971); Vetri, Educating the
Lawyer: Clinical Experience as an Integral Part of Legal Education, 50 OREGON
L. REV. 57 (1970).
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philosophy of Christopher Columbus Langdell, who was Dean of the
Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century.2 He instituted the
case method approach which viewed the law as a science which could be
taught by an analysis of legal rules and doctrines in appellate case law.
This was the beginning of the "academic" approach to the study of law.
The case method was a response to a general dissatisfaction with the
apprenticeship system whereby the aspiring young lawyer worked in a
law office under the supervision of an experienced attorney to gain pro-
ficiency in the law before he or she began to practice independently.
From the beginning, the universities looked upon the apprenticeship
system and the practicing lawyer, who controlled the apprenticeship
system, as rivals.' The development of the case method with its empha-
sis on doctrine and substantive law gave to the academicians the
weapon they needed to downgrade the legal profession as it was prac-
ticed. Early in this century, the movement toward the academic training
of young lawyers took hold, and the requirements for bar examinations
were changed to allow the substitution of university law training for
apprenticeship.' The law schools came to reflect more and more a kind
of elitism which began to grow into a disrespect for the practitioner and
the competitive apprenticeship system. It was but a brief step to the
complete elimination of the apprenticeship system.
The "gap" which is always being "bridged" when the student enters
practice after graduation from law school and the passage of the bar,
finds its roots in this original enmity based essentially on early competi-
tion.5 The divorcement of scholarship from the practice of law was one
of the most unfortunate aspects of the development of law schools in the
United States.'
Law schools have suffered, in part, because many teachers have had
little or no knowledge of the real world of the practitioner other than
what they were able to glean from decisional law. Many professors have
feared development of clinical programs because one always fears most
that which one knows least. Under the "publish or perish" syndrome,
teaching became a secondary function in the law schools and students
considered a necessary evil. As a result, law schools often became a
refuge for individuals with little interest in either the practice or
teaching of the law.
2 See A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 162 (1967).
' Id. at 174.
See J. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners,
1900-1922, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Fleming & Baily eds. 1971).
' Kocourek, A Gap in Law School Training and a Way to Bridge It, 5 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 334 (1924); Stephenson, More on Bridging the Gap, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC.
259 (1954-55).
See Stevens, Aging Mistress: The Law School in America, in CHANGE IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 32 (1970).
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By contrast, the clinical approach to legal education not only brings
with it a revolution in the methodology of teaching, but it also requires
a change in the type of person who is selected to teach these courses.
The Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc., in
a newsletter published in the early 1970's, noted that most of the indi-
viduals who teach these courses are a "different breed of cat. 7 They
were found to be younger (median date of birth was 1940), and to have
been teaching only a short period of time (median time was only two
years). Most had had no teaching experience prior to accepting their
instructoral roles (fully 81.9 percent), and most, if not all, had practiced
prior to coming to their law school. Few came directly from law school
and clerking into teaching, the traditional route to success in academe.
Given the historical perspective outlined above, it is not surprising
that clinical education has met so much resistance. However, the public
and the profession demand change. As early as 1921, it was recognized
that the law schools were not fulfilling their promise. "The failure of the
modern American law school to make any adequate provision in its cur-
riculum for practical training constitutes a remarkable educational
anomaly."' The present Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court has also spoken on the subject.' In his appraisal of the shortcom-
ings of the profession, he has not spared the law schools.
A second cause of inadequate advocacy derives from certain
aspects of law school education. Law schools fail to inculcate suf-
ficiently the necessity of high standards of professional ethics,
manners and etiquettes as things basic to the lawyer's function.
With few exceptions, law schools also fail to provide adequate
and systematic programs by which students may focus on the
elementary skills of advocacy."°
Clinical education is not a "shibboleth" nor a panacea for the prob-
lems that are evident in our institutions and our society. However, little
is going to be done about them if the law schools turn away and con-
tinue with "traditional" education. If the goal of legal education is to
train students to "think like lawyers," that is, to approach problems
rationally and to think logically, then many methods should be utilized
to attain that goal. A brief description of "conventional legal education"
strongly suggests that what currently passes for legal education leaves
much to be desired.
I A Preliminary Profile of Clinical Law Teachers, 6 COUNCIL ON LEG. EDUC.
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY NEWSLETTER, No. 3 (Nov. 1973).
s Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law, 15 CARNEGIE FNDN.
ADVANCEMENT TEACHING BULL. 281 (1921).
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
10 Id. at 4-5.
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[Clonventional legal education consists of (1) relatively large
classes that engage in analyzing "cases" (usually the opinions of
appellate courts) by the Socratic method (the teacher asking ques-
tions, the students answering); (2) seminars on topics removed
from those treated in large classes and utilizing a diversity of
materials; and (3) independent research, mainly on or for the law
review."
A properly planned and supervised clinical program can be as
rigorous as the more traditional approach to learning substantive law
and doctrine. It does not suffer from the serious limitation of the tradi-
tional method since students not only learn doctrine but they also learn
how to weigh and analyze facts. As one critic has pointed out, "the
modern law schools do a superb job in teaching law as distinguished
from practice which is so much concerned with gathering, analyzing,
marshalling, interpreting and presenting facts." 2 Most clinical teachers
have experienced the problem of the bright student who has been trained
to deal with doctrine and principles in a tight and logical manner.
However, when he or she approaches a problem where he or she must
select and analyze the important facts and determine the relevant doc-
trine, he or she has a great deal of difficulty. He or she is a product of a
system whose view of the law is limited to doctrinal considerations.
Clinical education is not simply a substitute for the first year of prac-
tice, nor it is an escape from the "rigors" of intellectual pursuit,'" nor is
it just a process of teaching "how to" and practical skills. Students
should come away from a close scrutiny of the legal system as it actually
works with new insights as to what the law ought to be and what is
wrong with the current system. Students learn to analyze the multiple
and complex goals of the participants within the system, to identify the
methods used, and to understand the resolution of the conflicts and
inconsistencies. The students' experience also enriches the faculty by
bringing to their attention new and untapped areas of legal research.
One of the most important aspects of a clinical program is the devel-
opment of a feeling of professional responsibility by the students for
their clients, the courts and society. At a time when the ethical stan-
" H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 38 (1972)
[herinafter cited as PACKER & EHRLICH].
" Burger, A Sick Profession, 27 FED. B. J. 228 (1968) (emphasis added). See
also Weinstein, The Teaching of Fact Skills in Courses Presently in the Cur-
riculum, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 463 (1954).
," Dean Abraham S. Goldstein of Yale Law School recognized one important
contribution of clinical education to the rest of the curriculum:
It has seemed to me in the past that clinical education is most effective
when it takes students who are turned off in a variety of ways and
makes concrete for them a lot of very abstract things. And for many of
1980]
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dards of lawyers are being intensely questioned, it is vital that lawyers-
to-be learn to take responsibility for their actions through firsthand
exposure to the ethical problems which a practicing attorney faces
daily.
Thanks to the enactment of student practice acts in numerous states,
many students are able to get actual courtroom experience under the
supervision of their clinical teachers. In court, the students are forced to
make conscious choices, view the results, and analyze the success or
failure of their decision. One truly begins to learn professional respon-
sibility when one learns first to accept responsibility for one's own acts.
Young lawyers who have had the benefit of a clinical program know
that when they take the oath of office and embark on their legal careers,
they will not be learning the practice of law at the expense of their
clients. By assuming responsibility for teaching competence in the prac-
tice of law, law schools with clinical classes demonstrate graphically to
their students the meaning of professional responsibility.
The legal profession is unusual in that it does not as yet require
actual practice under licensed, competent and experienced supervisors
before independent work may be undertaken. Clinical education can
begin to remedy this deficiency. Students will benefit by more intensive
preparation and a better understanding of the ethical and intellectual
mandates of their profession. Clients will benefit by more effective
representation. Law schools will benefit by turning out students better
fitted to pursue the profession they have chosen. The legal profession
will benefit by the infusion of an increasingly mature and responsible
group of young lawyers into the system. Finally, our society will benefit
by being able to repose confidence in attorneys who better comprehend
their roles and who fully appreciate the responsibilities that come with
the privilege of practicing law.
The past few years have augured well for the future of clinical legal
education. With the ongoing support of organizations such as the Coun-
cil on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility and with the
visibility and encouragement provided by symposia such as this, the
outlook for more clinical courses in this country's law schools is cer-
tainly promising. It is only in this way that the historical gap between
legal theory and practice finally can be bridged.
them it turns them back into the academic exercise in a very, very effec-
tive way.
PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 11, at 41.
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